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PATENT LAW AND MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION
CLAIM LANGUAGE: WHERE IT WAS, WHERE
IT IS (POST WILLIAMSON V. CITRIX), AND
WHERE IT SHOULD GO IN THE FUTURE
Joel Bradley*
In response to proliferating abuse of the functional
language allowances governing means-plus-function
patent claims in 35 U.S.C. § 112, the Federal Circuit, in
its recent decision Williamson v. Citrix, lowered the
presumption againstpatent claims arisingunder § 112.
Before Citrix, there existed a strongpresumption that the
scope of § 112 did not encompass claims not including
the specific language "means"-aloophole that drafters
employed to avoid being subject to § 112 limitations.
The Federal Circuit sought to remedy this loophole by
lowering the strength of the presumption and also by
shifting the focus of the presumption to language
analogous to "mean." This Note argues that the Federal
Circuit was correct in lowering the presumption, but
that the term "means" should be removed from the
analysis entirely, and the focus should be on functional
language in general.

J.D. Candidate, 2018, University of Georgia School of Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The original purpose of the patent system was to engender an
incentive system. This arrangement provides inventors with the
benefit of a twenty-year monopoly in exchange for a detailed
disclosure within the patent that allows another to reproduce the
invention once the monopoly period has passed.1 In theory, this
system is an effective mechanism for fostering innovation by
reducing inventors' infringement concerns (patent holders may sue
for infringement damages) 2 or alternatively by allowing
monetization through licensing agreements. 3 This idealistic view of
spurring innovation, however, has become more of a secondary
concern over the years; monetary gain is now taking priority over
innovation as patent drafters try to obtain the broadest possible
4
claim scope without regard for proper disclosure of the invention.
One historical method for accomplishing broad patent claims is
through functional claiming-where a patent drafter claims "the
5
end [the invention] accomplishes, not the means of getting there."
To illustrate, compare the following two claims: (1) a vehicle
comprising a chassis and four wheels and, (2) a means for
transporting objects or people at high velocities. The difference here
is evident: both claims encompass the invention of the modern day
automobile, but the second claim potentially covers a much broader
scope than the first claim (for example, it could also cover a speed
boat or a plane). This shows why functional claims are so attractive
to patent drafters.
The modern day embodiment of functional claiming exists in the
"means-plus-function" claim.6 This type of functional claim is
1 Sean B. Seymore, Symposium, The Disclosure of the Patent System, 69 VAND. L. REV.
1455, 1455 (2016).
2 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2018).
3 Adam Mossoff, The History of Patent Licensing and Secondary Markets in Patents: An
Antidote to FalseRhetoric, CENTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Dec.
9, 2013), https:/cpip.gmu.edu/2013/12/09/the-history-of-patent-licensing-and-secondarymarkets-in-patents-an-antidote-to-false-rhetoric/ ('The patent licensing business model is
not a new phenomenon in the commercialization of patented innovation in the marketplace.").
4 See Mark A. Lemley, Robert W. Kastenmeier Lecture: Software Patents and the Return
of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 905, 911 ("Rather than claiming the device they
actually built or described, inventors sought to identify the inventive contribution and to
claim any device that incorporated that inventive contribution, even if it was not identical to
the patentee's device.").
5 Id. at 923.
6 See infra notes 8-9.
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narrower in scope than a general functional claim because it limits
the scope of the claim to the particular technology disclosed in the
patent instead of allowing every means for performing the claimed
function.7 On its face, this scope limitation seems like a reasonable
compromise that allows drafters to submit broader functional
claims over purely structural claims. The issue is that, for the scope
limitation to apply, the claim language must trigger either § 112(f)
of the America Invents Act for patents filed on or after September
16, 2012,8 or § 112 Paragraph 6 of the Patent Act of 1952 for patents
filed before this date. 9 Until recently, § 112(f) and § 112 Paragraph
6 have been relatively easy to avoid if the patent drafter does not
use the language "means" or "means for" in their claims. 10
The means-plus-function claim construction analysis comprises
a two-part test. First, the court determines whether the claim
triggers § 112(f) (hereinafter "§ 112(f)" will be used to refer to both
§ 112(f) and § 112 Paragraph 6 unless § 112 Paragraph 6 is
referenced individually). 1 During this step, the court will presume
§ 112(f) is triggered if the word "means" is used in the claim. 12 As
this Note will later explain, the difficulty of overcoming this
presumption has changed over the years. Second, if the court
concludes the claim is subject to § 112(f), it will look to patent
specifications for "corresponding structure." 13 If the court finds no
14
such structure, the claim is invalidated.
Until the Federal Circuit's recent decision in Williamson v.
Citrix,1 5 the standard-for at least the past decade-has been that
the absence of the word "means" from the claim establishes a
"strong" presumption against construing a claim as a § 112(f)
means-plus-function claim. 16 Conversely, a claim including the
word "means" established a rebuttable presumption that the claim

7 Lemley, supra note 4, at 916-17.
s America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C § 112(f) (2018).
9 Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (current version at 35 U.S.C § 112
(2018)).
10 See infra pp. 11-15.
11 TriPlay, Inc. v. WhatsApp, Inc., No. 13-1703-LPS-CJB, 2016 LEXIS 85583, at *13-14

(D. Del. June 30, 2016) (citations omitted).
12

Id.

13

Id.
Id.

14

15 Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
16 Id. at 1348.
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was a § 112(f) means-plus-function claim. 17 The court in Citrix
lowered this standard by lowering the strength of the presumption
when "means" is not included in the claim. A post-Citrix,challenger
can overcome a presumption against classifying a claim as a
§ 112(6) means-plus-function claim if "[he] demonstrates that the
claim term fails to 'recite[] sufficiently definite structure ....' "18
This Note discusses the status of the standard established in
Citrix as applied to post-Citrix claim construction cases. This Note
also discusses some of the considerations that patent drafters
should keep in mind when choosing claim language given the new
standard. Finally, the Note argues that the Federal Circuit was
correct in altering the standard, but § 112(f) might be best served
by further legislative amendments.
Part II of this Note discusses functional claiming, as it existed
prior to the Citrix decision. Part II begins by providing a brief
overview of the history of functional claiming, beginning in the early
nineteenth century, and evolving into the more narrowly defined
"means-plus-function" claim found in § 112(f).
Part II also
illustrates how courts construed claim language in relation to
§ 112(f) means-plus-function claims prior to Citrix.
Part III of this Note provides an overview of the Citrix case,
including a factual background, the new standard that the Federal
Circuit adopted (or actually re-adopted), and how the court applied
the new standard to its particular facts.
Part IV of this Note delves into the post-Citrix world of functional
claiming. It begins by providing examples of both district court and
Federal Circuit means-plus-function claim construction cases
decided subsequent to Citrix. It then considers the effect of Citrix
on the software industry (where functional claims are omnipresent).
Finally, it discusses some of the considerations that patent drafters
should keep in mind when deciding whether to use means-plusfunction claim language post-Citrix.
Part V of this Note argues that the standard change in Citrix was
necessary, but there is room for improvement by the legislature.

17
18

Id.
Id. (quoting Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 880 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
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II. PRE-CITRIX FUNCTIONAL CLAIMING
A. HISTORY OF FUNCTIONAL CLAIMING

Patents were traditionally intended to be disclosures of the
actual invention that an inventor conceived. 19 This was the norm
until the middle of the nineteenth century, when patent drafters
began using functional language to broaden the scope of their claims
to include not only the invention that they actually conceived, but
also every other potential invention that could perform similar
functions. 20 Kastenmeier provides the example of the Wright
Brothers, who invented an aircraft stability system involving a
single cable that moved an aircraft's wing and rudder
simultaneously. 21 Instead of claiming the cable system specifically,
however, their claims included language such as "means for
simultaneously moving the lateral portions." 22 This functional
language allowed the Wright Brothers to assert infringement claims
against inventors who invented a system in which the rudder and
wing could be moved independently of one another merely because
it fell within the broad scope of the Wright Brothers' functional
23
claim language.
Congress became concerned that these types of functional claims
would hinder market competition, and subsequently passed the
Patent Act of 1952.24 The 1952 Act did not eliminate functional
claiming completely, but instead limited the scope of functional
claims through § 112 Paragraph 6.25 Section 112 Paragraph 6
defined what is called a "means-plus-function" claim and included
the language, "An element in a claim... may be expressed as a
means ... for performing a specified function... and such claim
shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure ... in the

19 Lemley, supra note 4, at 910.
20 See id. at 911-12 (explaining a shift toward "peripheral claiming," which is not
commonplace).
21 See id. at 913 (noting how the Wright Brothers' patent used functional language).
22 Id.
23 See id. (discussing how Glenn Curtiss' design was blocked by the Wright Brothers'
patent, despite significant design differences).
24 See id. at 914-15 (explaining the events and controversy leading up to the Patent Act
of 1952).
25 See id. at 916 (noting how § 112(f) placed certain restrictions upon financial claiming).
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specification .. . ,"26 This same language is also included in § 112(f)
of the recently passed America Invents Act and survives as the
27
current statutory basis for means-plus-function claims.
B. MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION CLAIM CONSTRUCTION PRE-CITRIX

Until 2004, the Federal Circuit, which handles all patent case
appeals, followed a standard similar to the Citrix standard used
today. 28 The essential inquiry did not revolve around the use of the
word "means," but rather depended on whether "the words of the
claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have
29
a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure."
Around 2004, however, the Federal Circuit raised this standard
by indicating that a lack of the term "means" leads to a "strong"
presumption against subjecting a claim to § 112 Paragraph 6.30 In
2012 the Federal Circuit subsequently raised the standard even
higher by stating that "[w]hen the claim [has not used] the term
'means,' we are unwilling to apply [§ 112 Paragraph 6] without a
showing that the limitation essentially is devoid of anything that
can be construed as structure. ' 31 Because of this heightened
presumption, a number of patent holders were able to avoid
indefiniteness under § 112 Paragraph 6 simply by omitting "means"
32
from their claim language.

26 See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (current version at 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 (2018)).
27 America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2018).
28 The use of the word "means" in a claim created a rebuttable presumption that the claim

was a § 112(6) or § 112(f) means-plus-function claim; the absence of the word "means" created
a rebuttable presumption that the claim was not a § 112(6) or § 112(f) means-plus-function
claim. Personalized Media Commc'ns., LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 161 F.3d 696, 703-04
(1998).
29 Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
30 Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
This heightened standard was echoed in Inventio AG v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Americas
Corp., 649 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
31 Flo Healthcare Sols., LLC v. Kappos, 697 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (emphasis
added).
32 See Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("When the claim
drafter has not signaled his intent to invoke [§ 112] by using the term 'means,' we are
unwilling to apply that provision .. " (quoting Flo Healthcare,697 F.3d at 1374)).
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III. WILLIAMSON V. CITRIX
A. FACTS

Citrix was an infringement suit involving a patent discussing a
technology for virtual classroom learning environments (the "'840
Patent").33 Claim 8 of the '840 Patent includes the language "[a]
system for conducting distributed learning among a plurality of
computer systems . . . comprising ...a distributed learning control
module... ."34 In the district court, this language was construed as
a means-plus-function claim triggering § 112(f). 35 In applying
§ 112(f), the district court, and subsequently the Federal Circuit,
invalidated claim 8 on the grounds that the patent specification did
not include sufficient structural language corresponding to the
36
function laid out in the claim.
B. ANALYSIS

The Federal Circuit, in affirming the district court's decision
regarding claim 8, abandoned the standard it had established over
the last decade. 37 In doing so, the Federal Circuit came to the
conclusion that the characterization of a claim lacking the word
''means" as having a "strong" presumption against being subject to
§ 112(f) is not the appropriate presumption. 38 Instead, it reverted
back to its pre-Lighting World standard by placing less of an
emphasis on the term "means" and instead focusing the essential
inquiry on "whether the words of the claim are understood by
persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite
meaning as the name for structure." 39 The effect of this standard
change was not on the means-plus-function test itself, but rather on
the strength of the presumptions associated with the first part of

33 Citrix, 792 F.3d at 1343.
34 Id. at 1344.
35 Id. at 1345.
36

Id.

37 See Flo Healthcare Sols., LLC v. Kappos, 697 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding that

the term "height adjustment mechanism" invoked § 112, but there was sufficient structure so
that the presumption against being a means-plus-function claim was overcome); Lighting
World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (construing the
"connector assembly" as a means-plus-function claim).
38 Citrix, 792 F.3d at 1349.
39

Id.
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the test, effectively enlarging the scope of claims that § 112(f)
encompasses.
In the relevant portion of the Citrix decision, the word "module"
was the main source of contention. 40 Because the word "module"
was used instead of "means" a presumption initially existed that
claim 8 was not a means-plus-function claim (a presumption that
defendants later overcame in the district court). 4 1 In upholding the
district court's decision, the Federal Circuit agreed that the full
term "'distributed learning control module' does not have a well
' 42
understood structural meaning in the computer technology field."
The court reaffirmed the district court's finding that "module" is
"simply a generic description for software or hardware," on par with
other generic terms such as "device" or "mechanism." 43 Finally, the
court noted that the presence of modifiers can provide structure to
an otherwise generic term, but the modifiers in claim 8 did not
44
produce such a result.
IV. POST- CITRIX FUNCTIONAL CLAIMING
A. DECISIONS AFTER CITRIX

Because Citrix was decided in 2015, both district courts and the
Federal Circuit have had a chance to decide means-plus-function
45
claim construction cases in light of the Citrix standard.
1. District Court Cases. Of the hundred-plus cases tried in
district courts since the Citrix decision, the overwhelming majority
of cases have adopted the new standard articulated by the Federal
Circuit.46 In fact, as of December 2015, only one district court case

40 Id. at 1350.
41 Id. at 1349.
42 Id. at 1350.
43

Id.

44 Id. at 1351.

45 See infra note 46 (district court cases); infra note 48 (Federal Circuit cases).
46 See, e.g., M2M Sols. LLC v. Sierra Wireless America, Inc., No. 12-30-RGA, WL 5826816,
at *2 (D. Del. Oct. 2, 2015) (directly quoting the Citrix standard); Vir2us, Inc. v. Invincea,
Inc., No. 2:15cv162, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22098, at *13-14 (E.D. Va. Feb. 19, 2016) (also
directly quoting Citrix).
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presumption

2. Federal Circuit Cases. More importantly, Citrix has also been
cited numerous times by the Federal Circuit. 48 All of these Federal
49
Circuit decisions reference and apply the new Citrix standard.
Advanced Ground Information Systems v. Life360, Inc.,50 decided
in 2016, provides one specific example. Life360 involved two
patents containing claims including the language "a symbol
generator." 51 In its analysis, the Federal Circuit found that the term
"symbol generator" fell under § 112(f) despite the fact that the term
"means" was not used in the claim. 52 Here, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's determination that "symbol generator"
is actually analogous to "means" because it "is simply a description
of the function performed."53 Life360 stands for the notion that the
Federal Circuit, at the bare minimum, is going to follow the Citrix
standard and is much more likely to construe a claim as falling
under § 112(f) in the future.
B. IMPLICATIONS OF CITRIX WITH RESPECT TO SOFTWARE CLAIMS

While Citrix affects patent claims for technologies spanning most
industries to relatively the same degree, it is important to also
specifically consider the effect of Citrix on software patent claims,
54
since these claims almost necessitate functional claim language.
With the advent and growth of the computer, internet, and other
related technologies in the past couple of decades, the courts faced

47 TriPlay, Inc. v. WhatsApp, Inc., No. 13-1703-LPS-CJB, 2016 WL 3574012 n.7, at *5 (D.
Del. June 30, 2016) ("[T]he Court agrees with TriPlay that it should still utilize pre-[Citrix]
Federal Circuit caselaw in analyzing whether disputed terms convey sufficiently definite
structure .... ).
48 See, e.g., Advanced Ground Info. Sys. v. Life360, Inc., 830 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (directly quoting the Citrix standard); Voice Domain Techs., LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 1340138-TSH, 2015 WL 4638577, at *7 (D. Mass. Aug. 4, 2015) (also directly quoting the Citrix
standard).
49 Life360, 830 F.3d at 1347; Apple Inc., 2015 WL 4638577, at *7.
50 830 F.3d 1341.
51 Id. at 1345.
52 Id. at 1347.
53 Id.
54 See Lemley, supra note 4, at 919 ("Computer software gives patentees the opportunity
to take abstraction in patent claiming to the extreme ... [and] write 'structural' claims in
which the structure is not novel and does no work.").
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the question of how to deal with the patentability of the software
programs used to operate these technologies. Courts further face
the even more concerning issue that a majority of software patent
claims, if not all, are drafted in the most broad and functional terms
55
possible.
In one regard, the Supreme Court's decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Internationalreduced the surge of software patents. The case
essentially stated that an invention cannot simply take an abstract
idea "well known in the art," apply it to a computer, and expect to
receive a patent protection.5 6 The Court in Alice cites several
examples, including creating a software program to accomplish the
already-established common economic concept of hedging financial
risk. 57 However, the task of determining what to do with the drove
of software patent claims that pass the Alice filter remains.
Of course, ideally the courts should be able to simply employ the
§ 112(f) restrictions to force the software patent drafter to
significantly narrow the scope of his claims to the particular
algorithm used in the software. However, as of 2013, this was not
always how the process played out in court. 58 Functional claim
opponents need not fear, however, as there is evidence that the
courts are pushing to subject all software patent claims to the
§ 112(f) limitations. 59 Once a software claim falls under § 112(f), the
courts have shown that they will not hesitate to invalidate the claim
if it does not disclose "a sufficient algorithm as corresponding
structure," instead of just a "general purpose computer" (at least in
60
the past couple years).
The Citrix piece fits into this software patent claiming puzzle by
helping to clear the path for categorizing software claims as § 112(f)
means-plus-function claims. While patent drafters will still likely

55 Id. at 907.
56 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2350 (2014).
57 Id. at 2356.
58 Professor Lemley states that a simple change such as replacing the language "means

for doing" with "a generic reference to a general-purpose computer 'programmed to' achieve
those same steps ... and the [court] no longer treats the claim as [falling under § 112 or
112(f)] ... and accordingly puts no limit on the functional nature of the claim." Lemley, supra
note 4, at 946. He further elaborates by stating "current cases treat 'a computer' (or
equivalents like 'a processor . . .') as a structural definition of the software invention, except
where the patentee happened to make the mistake of using the word 'means.'" Id.
59 Kirk Teska, (The Unfortunate) Future of Software Patents Under 35 USC § 101 and
§ 112, 16 J. HIGH TECH. L. 394, 405-06 (2016).
60 Verint Sys. v. Red Box Recorders, Ltd., 166 F. Supp. 3d 364, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
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be forced to use functional language in software claims, without the
''strong" presumption against claims not including the term "means"
being means-plus-function claims, patent drafters seeking broad
functional protection will have a tougher time doing so without
61
being subject to the § 112(f) limitations.
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR PATENT PROSECUTION STRATEGY

Citrix forces patent drafters to take a number of considerations
into account when deciding whether to include means-plus-function
language in their patent claims. The clearest new consideration is
that drafters will no longer be able to confidently side-step § 112(f)
by not using the language "means" in their claims. This alone
should serve as somewhat of a general deterrent against meansplus-function claims (with the exception of software patent claims)
because once the functional claims are subject to § 112(f), the scope
of the claims is effectively narrowed enough to thwart the purpose
of using functional language. 62
Another major consideration is that, in choosing to use meansplus-function language, drafters will be taking the risk that a court
will invalidate these claims if the patent specification does not
sufficiently disclose the structure associated with the function
While on its face the
presented in the claims language. 63
specification disclosure requirement does not seem difficult to
surmount, post-Citrix courts have shown that they will not take the
limitation lightly, 64 and it might not be worth the risk given the
potential magnitude of monetary damages at play in patent
65
litigation.
61 See, e.g., id. at 379-80 (construing one particular claim as a means-plus-function claim
regardless of the fact that the term "means" wasn't specifically used because the term
"computer application" included in the claim did not define sufficient structure).
62 This is because § 112 claims require structure disclosures, when the original intent of
the drafter was to possess a broader, structure-less claim.
63 Both § 112 and 112(f) state that the "[C]laim shall be construed to cover the
corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification or equivalents
thereof." See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (current version at 35
U.S.C § 112 (2018)); 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2018).
64 See, e.g., Advanced Ground Info. Sys. v. Life360, Inc., 830 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (deeming a means-plus-function claim invalid because the specification discussed
symbols being generated generally, but "fail[ed] to [disclose] an 'algorithm' or description as
to how those symbols are actually 'generated' ").
65 See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 727 F.3d 1214, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ("[A]warding
Apple more than $1 billion in damages.").
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With these considerations in play, drafters will likely be
reluctant to include potentially invalid or narrowing means-plusfunction claims within their claim set. Justifications for including
these types of functional claims still exist, however. For example, if
a specific type of technology necessitates the use of functional claim
language (software patents), there are arguably also some litigation
benefits, but the potential downsides appear to outweigh the
benefits.66 Nevertheless, empirical evidence tends to indicate that
the use of means-plus-function claims has drastically fallen over the
last decade, and there is no indication that the trend with change
67
directions anytime soon.
V. ANALYSIS OF CITRIX PRESUMPTION SHIFT
A. DID THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT MAKE THE CORRECT DECISION?

The Federal Circuit made the correct decision in lowering the
presumption against a Claim triggering § 112(f) when "means" is
not included in the language, a decision supported by the
constitutional underpinnings of patent law.
The first source of support for the Federal Circuit's decision
comes from the constitutional foundation for patent law.68 Article I
section eight of the U.S. Constitution states the purpose of the
patent (and copyright) system is "to promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts" 6 9 This section intends to "provi[de] the public with
the benefit of lower price through unfettered competition."' 70 But
claim drafters do not seek to "promote the progress of science," they
draft around § 112(f) limitations to seek unjustified increases in

66 See Steven Katz, Do's and Don'ts for Claim Drafting: A Litigator's Perspective,
http://www.fr.com/filesfUploads/attachments/muenchen/presentation8.pdf (last visited Oct.
25, 2016) (discussing how fact finders determine the scope of "equivalents" to the structures
disclosed in the specification).
67 Nicholas R. Mattingly, Avoiding Invocation of FunctionalClaim Language in Computer-

Implemented Inventions, IPWATCHDOG (June 18, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/

06/18/avoiding-invocation-of-functional-claim-language-in-computer-implementedinventions/id=58803/. The evidence presented on this webpage indicates a decline in the use
of the specific language "means for" in patent claims. This could simply indicate drafters
attempting to side-step § 112, but it would still evidence drafters' reluctance to draft meansplus-function claims.
68 See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
69 See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
70 Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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market control. 71 The reason patents have so many limitations is
because the constitutional drafters sought to strike a balance. They
wanted to provide enough incentive to inventors to warrant
investing time and capital in inventing without fear of
infringement, while not providing the inventors with so much power
72
as to hinder the future growth of that technology and market.
Claim drafters seeking to avoid appropriate statutory limitations by
drafting broad functional claims violate the intent the intent of the
constitutional drafters.
In addition to its consistency with the constitutional aim of
facilitating the progress of science and the arts, the Citrix standard
goes further by ensuring that the progress sought by the
Constitution is actually realized. One of the main issues with broad,
functional claims is that they cover a wide scope of potential
technology without really providing any specific instructions on how
to recreate these technologies. This is counter, not only to the
purpose of patents, but all intellectual property in general. 73 By
lowering the presumption against claims not subject to § 112(f)
limitations, the Federal Circuit is ensuring that the drafters include
enough detail in their patent specification as to allow a person of
ordinary skill in the relevant art to physically "recreate, emulate, or
74
manufacture" the invention listed in the patent claims.
B. WHAT CHANGES SHOULD BE MADE TO THE STANDARD?

While the Federal Circuit was correct in lowering the
presumption against a claim not being a means-plus-function claim,
given the purpose of doing so, it would make sense to also modify
the standard as a whole. The presumption states that "when a
claim lacks the word 'means,' the presumption can be
overcome.., if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term
71 A good example of this is found in the Wright Brothers broad functional patent claims
described in Part II of this Note. See generally supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text..
72 See, e.g., Stephan Kinsella, "The" Purpose of Patent Law, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF
INNOVATIVE FREEDOM (Dec. 6, 2010), http://c4sif.org/2010/12/the-purpose-of-patent-law/
("Without an intellectual property[ ] regime, innovators would keep their discoveries safely
secured from competitors .. " (citation omitted)).
OFFICE,
AND
TRADEMARK
PATENT
UNITED
STATES
73 See
Glossary,
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/glossary (last visited Mar. 29, 2018) (defining
"intellectual property" as "[c]reations of the mind-creative works or ideas embodied in a form
that can be shared or can enable others to recreate, emulate, or manufacture them").
74 Id.
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fails to 'recite sufficiently definite structure.'-75 Even though the
presumption against a means-plus-function claim is now less
difficult to overcome, the party challenging the patent claim still has
a burden of proving that the claim should be subject to § 112(f)
limitations. 76 Although it is not likely that this burden will deter
plaintiffs in patent infringement suits, there are some situations
where the burden does not seem necessary.
Life360 presents an example of the most obvious situation in
which a court may not require the patent challenger to prove the
claim should be subject to § 112(f) limitations. In Life360 the
drafters did not specifically use the term "means," but used a term
analogous enough to have essentially the same meaning. 77 The
Federal Circuit found in Life360 that the term "symbol generator"
was analogous enough to "means" and thus it was not necessary for
the plaintiff to prove this. 78 While this appears to be more of a
discretionary decision by the Federal Circuit in this particular case,
the Federal Circuit could apply it in all claim construction claims as
an inherent component of the standard.
With cases like Life360 in mind, in order to streamline the claim
construction process, it seems intuitive for the courts to move away
from placing so much emphasis on the one term "means."
Coincidently, the statutory language of § 112(f) does include the
term "means." However, the real overarching purpose of the statute
is to place limitations on overly broad functional claims in general,
and there appears to be no indication as to why the term "means"
was specifically chosen to represent such a broad category. 79 It is
also important the legislature included the term "step for" along
with "means" in § 112(f).80 This provides further evidence that the
intent of this statute was to protect against broad functional
claiming in general because the statutory drafters chose to include
a term other than "means" in the language.

75 William v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Watts v.
XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
Id.
77 Advanced Ground Info. Sys. v. Life360, Inc., 830 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
78 Id.
79 As mentioned in Part II of this Note, the means-plus-function language was originally
76

included in the 1952 Patent Act, which was engendered as a response to concerns overly
functional claim language. See supranote 24 and accompanying discussion.
80 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2018).
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Ideally, the legislature would amend § 112(f) to include language
analogous to "means for," or just expand the language to include any
functional claim without accompanied structural definitions.
However, until such legislation is passed, the courts are stuck with
interpreting the present language. This should not serve as too
much of a hurdle, however, as the Federal Circuit has already
shown its willingness to look to analogous terms in Life360.
There is one caveat to adopting a broader analogous terms
approach to functional claim construction: the existence of method
claims.
Method claims involve patents over "methods" or
"processes" (for example, a method for manufacturing a certain type
of drug).8 1 Method claims differ from means-plus-function claims
because they only cover the method or process used and do not
involve any structural components.8 2 This could create overlap
between the terms "method" and "process" used in method claims,
as they could potentially be seen as "means" synonyms. This
problem could easily be solved, however, by simply eliminating
"method" and "process" from the category of analogous terms.
VI. CONCLUSION

The patent system is a regime that seeks the right balance to
provide just enough incentive for society to progress as effectively
as possible in science and the arts. However, as with the vast
majority of systems in existence, there are ways to exploit it. In the
case of the patent system, patent drafters have been able to realize
more benefits from their patents than they should by using broad,
over-encompassing claim language in their patents. Thankfully,
Congress and the courts are moving towards plugging the gaps left
for exploitation in the system. However, the post-Citrix standard is
not perfect and still has room for improvement.

8' Timothy R. Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1010
(2017) ("For machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter, there necessarily is a
tangible item that a court or jury uses to assess infringement. This is not so with method
claims, where the bases of comparison are fleeting acts or steps. Under current law, the
claims processes technically do not cover the machine or other apparatus (if any) that
performs the process, but only the performance of the steps of the process." (citations
omitted)).
82

Id.
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